Category: Syria

Iraq and Syria

The future of Iraq and Syria looks uncertain to me, yet both countries have much potential if the leaders can accept to nurture what their nation states actually contain, i.e. a broad spectrum of people. If a centralised state is desired, a regime needs to encourage integration (without coercion), foster equal opportunities and support statehood participation by all citizens. Since their creation, during the mandate era, this has been a challenge for both Iraq and Syria.

The beginning of Iraq’s history saw some tribal groups under-represented by the country’s successive governments. The 2003 invasion might of somewhat corrected this issue, but nowadays some feel disenfranchised by the new regime.

In Syria’s history, there has been a lack of self-rule from the beginning, especially for the majority people. It is argued that the lack of experience in democracy led the country down the path of dictatorship (since gaining independence in 1946).

At the political level, the rule of the British Empire did not manage to effectively bring together the various peoples of Iraq, and the policies of the French Empire further divided the various regions of Syria. Today, both countries are challenged with establishing stability and safety, and to reach a political consensus amongst all peoples and regions.

Intervention from the United States of America has not really helped either. In Iraq, the Bush administration was short-sighted, it relied heavily on Nouri al-Maliki. Unity in his regime was short-lived: he turned a blind eye to the excesses of some of the militias (as long as they supported him). This in turn led to the rise of ISIS QSIS (al-Qaeda Separatists in Iraq and Syria).

Losing Iraq

The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. “St. John of Damascus”. Encyclopedia Britannica, 30 Nov. 2024, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Saint-John-of-Damascus

Marsham, Andrew. “11 Christians, Zoroastrians, Jews and Others in the Umayyad Empire”. The Umayyad Empire, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2023, pp. 257-293. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781399527392-020

Damascus

Damascus is the capital of modern day Syria and in a historical context is seen as the centre of “Sha’am”.  Here, you could still feel the old world.  Local tradition and culture is still alive here even with the abundance of satellite TV and Internet cafes.

Damascus is said to be the world’s longest continually inhabited city (I think there are even biblical references). At one time it was the capital of the Umayyad/Arabian republic.

More importantly, I use to regret not having studied in Damascus (before the problems).  I had been put off by the racism in immigration against the Asian diaspora in Europe and America, and the lack of improvement for the most impoverished in Syria.  Having said that, more recently the ‘animals’ stationed at the borders had been replaced with more cultured men, who warmly welcomed foreigners learning Arabic and would speak to them in standard Arabic.

Surprisingly, by returning to Jordan, I perhaps still attained some of what I originally wanted.  Interestingly, one of my teachers in Jordan was a Syrian, who had been teaching Arabic to foreigners at the Damascus university before the civil war started in his country.

He did not like the Jordan university centre’s style of teaching and apparent lack of grammar in the textbook. He loved grammar and although we found it difficult at first, he eventually drilled it into us.  It use to be that the only real benefit from Jordan was the vocabulary, but this Syrian teacher gave us that and much more.  It’s even possible that he taught more than what the students in the level above us were learning.  He had a unique and effective way of teaching.

A few of the students wanted less grammar in class and complained about him to the director.  The teacher felt that we were weak in some of the basics and so he spent some of the first few weeks blitzing through what he thought we should already know.  Most of us were content with that, but some were clearly not.  I did not mind, since I believed he was really trying to help us, and it worked.  The real issue for me was that he gave me that look of ‘why did you not complain to me first’ when actually it was not me who complained to anybody.

He would also go irate when I went in late for class or when I did not do all my homework (even when I was sick).  I sometimes felt sorry for him because he was getting paranoid, he believed that there was some conspiracy against Syria.  He use to share some of the horror stories regarding the conflict in his country.

I did not always understand his religious and political opinions, but after the lazy summer, this was just what I needed and I felt he gave a very good introduction to Arab culture.

After he left for Turkey, we really missed him.  Those of us who remained in Jordan were left to face the UJLC bullshit and we quickly realised that we had not valued our Syrian teacher enough.

British and French mandatory policies in Iraq and Syria between the two World Wars

Here I compare and contrast Iraq with Syria (specifically what later became the country Syria as opposed to Greater Syria, which might include Lebanon), focusing on political and economic sovereignty. After the First World War, the League of Nations entrusted the Iraqi mandate to the British Empire and the Syrian mandate to the French Empire. Initially, both Iraq and Syria came under direct rule from Britain and France respectively, but later experienced limited self-rule and eventually gained independence. However, as will be shown, the timetable and method used by these ‘former’ colonial Powers differed greatly.

Iraq was constructed from the three Ottoman provinces: Basra, Baghdad and Mosul. By the end of the First World War, Britain more or less occupied all three territories and for economic and security reasons decided to consolidate them. From ‘1921 Britain adopted a policy of devolving responsibilities to an ‘Iraqi’ government.’ This government was headed by a monarch and for that the British chose Faisal Husain (of the Hashemite dynasty, which had led the Arab revolt in Arabia during the First World War), who was forced to leave Syria (see below). Consequently, the new political and military elite of Iraq were made up of Amir Faisal and his Sharifian entourage – most of whom were Sunni Arabs. However, over half the Arab population were Shi’a, who did not trust British ambitions and were not keen with the idea of the new state if it did not fairly represent the Shi’a majority. In other words, a Shi’a nation ruled by a Sunni ex-Ottoman elite. This was complicated further by the Mosul province that included part of the ‘homeland’ of the Kurdish people (most of whom were Sunni). Including all three provinces in the new Iraq made the Shi’a the minority. However, Kurdish tribal leaders sought more autonomy and had significant support amongst their people. In addition to force and limited Iraqi self-rule, Britain used patronage to pacify the Iraqi leaders. Eventually, this worked with some of the Shi’a leaders in the South (especially after the main mujtahids had left for Iran).

Syria was also constructed from smaller Ottoman entities. The mandate (approved in 1922) ‘defined the objective of French rule as “to facilitate the progressive development of Syria and Lebanon as independent states”.’ However, France initially implemented policies similar to those used in its existing colonies elsewhere. Instead of using Amir Faisal to work towards an independent state, they ejected the ‘Arab nationalist Hashemite-led administration’ (that had arrived in Syria’s capitol of Damascus before the French) and replaced it and the previous Ottoman institutions. Syria’s Muslim population was eight-five percent, but unlike Iraq, the majority of Syria’s population was Sunni Muslim. They also made-up most of the traditional ex-Ottoman elite, but France had demoted their status by giving preference to minority groups (some of whom had been neglected by the Ottomans) . Many of the officials of the new administration were Frenchman and also lacked the necessary language skills (although this changed later). Most of the natives they employed were usually Christian and rarely Sunni Muslim. The ‘French staff officers generally held a low opinion of Arab Muslims, Kurds, and Druzes’ and even had a low opinion of the Syrian Officials they did employ. Even though in the long term, a large number of Frenchman were stationed in Syria there was little attempt to assimilate with the native people.

British policy towards Iraqi rule had initially been represented ‘by those who came to be known as the ‘imperial school’.’ For this reason direct rule had been attempted initially, but due to widespread dissatisfaction and unrest (which was seen as a result of direct rule and was very costly to suppress), it was decided that a more indirect form of rule should be pursued. This long term policy of indirect rule was illustrated in November 1920 when an ‘Iraqi’ government was formed, headed by the naqib al-ashraf of Bagdad, Sayyid ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Kailani, and with twenty-one Iraqi ministers. It was Sunni dominated but the ministers were from all three provinces and included a few Shi’a and Christians and one Jew. Here at least the British were taking note of Iraq’s demographics. The former Ottoman administrative units and municipal councils were also restored, ‘and Iraqi officials began to replace British political officers in the provinces (except in the Kurdish district of Sulaimaniyyah).’ However, British advisors assisted the Iraqi officials in the provinces and were attached to the new ministries. In June 1921 a ‘bogus referendum was held in which it was claimed that 96 per cent of the population of Iraq accepted the new king’ Faisal Husain ‘and on 23 August 1921 Faisal was ceremoniously enthroned.’ Britain control of Iraq was via treaties and in 1922 an Anglo-Iraqi treaty recognised the devolving of power to the Iraqi government. However, control was retained by Britain of financial, international, security and certain judicial affairs . This treaty was opposed by a great number of the masses as well as the elites. It is argued that Iraq had no choice but to accept the 1922 treaty, and that Britain gave the Constituent Assembly an ultimatum to ratify it. The meaning of this is that Iraq had not achieved full political sovereignty, nor did it have zero control over its affairs, but that Britain indirectly controlled Iraq. This in essence was the mandatory policy of Britain between the wars.

While Britain tried to unite the three provinces of Iraq, the French decided to divide Syria into three autonomous regions ‘with separate areas for the Alawis on the coast and the Druze in the south.’ Also, politically the French did not give any representation to the majority Sunni population whereas in Iraq representation was given to the Shi’a – albeit not accurately reflecting their percentage of the population. The ‘French administration was an oversized and expensive bureaucratic ship’ and eventually much of the financial burden of defence and public security was shifted onto the Syrian people. In Iraq the British were somewhat concerned with cost-effectiveness and therefore decided on indirect control. In other words, the British were prepared to use any means to gain from the Iraqi mandate (even as late as 1930 a treaty was signed – see below). Whereas the French were determined to keep direct control over the population, which in practice meant denying opportunities to the majority. In Iraq, an Arab nationalist (Amir Faisal) had become king, but in Syria the nationalists were denied the top jobs. Both Britain and France used and would continue to use force in their mandates. However, France’s method of relying on minorities and a large foreign administration (and army) was both costly and unstable. This also denied political experience to the Syrians when the state finally became independent.

Economic policy in Iraq could be dictated by patronage, which might include tax exemptions. Land-reform was sometimes used in order to maintain the power of the pro-Hashemite ruling elite or pacify potential enemies of the state. Several development projects had been planned and even implemented during the 1920s, however, most of the King’s energies and resources were devoted to ensuring his political survival. In the 1930s, the King had encouraged agricultural development, but lack of interest from affluent Iraqis and the British to invest meant that production from this sector was not increased. Britain’s significant economic policy towards Iraq concerned oil and via the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC) Britain acquired favourable concessions. Therefore, apart from oil, Britain did not really develop Iraq’s economy and in the 1930s Iraq faced economic difficulties. However, this is in part due to the world-wide economic recession – starting in 1929. Moreover, Britain’s economic policies were not directly harmful to the local economy.

On the other hand, French economic policy included controlling Syria’s monetary system. This fixed a new Syrian currency to the Franc, which later caused problems when the French currency lost it value to the US dollar. France also sold public utilities to French businesses and the transfer of the Muslim-owned Hejaz Railway to a French railroad company in 1924 caused a big outcry and protest in Syria. According to P. S. Khoury, the French violated the Mandate charter by favouring French business to the extent that it did not allow equality of opportunity to all members of the League of Nations. Also, the French High Commission unfairly served the interest of French businesses by manipulating markets, which caused harm to Syrian businesses. For example, false rumours of a bad harvest were spread and then grain exports were banned. French agents were then able to buy grain cheaply and sell at a higher prices when the borders were re-opened for export. There was generally a lack of encouragement or will (on the part of the French) to develop the Syrian economy, but only to further French commercial interests.

Britain’s significant policy in Iraq was intended to safeguard her trading interests in the Basra province and elsewhere and to guarantee access to oil in the region. This meant pursuing a very difficult policy of nation-building a state made up of the three most ethnically and religiously diverse Arab-majority regions of the former Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire had hitherto administrated these lands as separate decentralised provinces. But Britain wanted a buffer (Baghdad) for the southern Basra province and a buffer (Mosul) for Baghdad and its policies were indifferent to the local situation. Oil made a unified Iraq even more important and it was vital to maintain the power of the Hashemite King (who was Arab, had religious significance and a British ally). As long as Britain’s commercial and security objectives were met her policy was quite relaxed in other areas. Existing elites were encouraged to work with the largely new Sharifian elites. Also, there was not much intrusion in religion, for example, the Organic law of 1925 made Islam the state religion. The main issue of the Shi’a was political power – they were under-represented. In Syria, however, the French decided and maintained a large presence and left the country only as late as 1946. Their policy was direct rule and economic control. Britain’s and France’s policies were similar in that neither country wanted true sovereignty for their mandates. The British would only support it as long as their interests were satisfied so their intentions were similar to the French. The difference is whereas Britain’s policies can clearly be seen as paving the way for Iraqi native rule, France’s policy is seen by P. S. Khoury and W. L. Cleveland as though Syria was a mandate only by name, and in practice a newly acquired colony to exploit and deny sovereignty to.

Bibliography

Cleveland, W. L, A History of the Modern Middle East, 1994, Boulder.

Eppel M, Iraq from Monarchy to Tyranny: From the Hashemites to the Rise of Saddam, Florida: 2004, University of Florida.

Khoury, P. S, Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism 1920-1945, London: 1987, I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd.

Tripp, C, A History of Iraq, Cambridge: 2000, CUP.

Yapp, M.E. The Making of the Modern Near East 1792-1923, London: 1987, Pearson Education.