Hizb ut-Tahrir and Communism

Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) is a political party, which started its activities in the Middle East, then spread worldwide. It was founded in the 1950s by Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani. Like their off-shoot (who use to call themselves) al-Muhajirun, HT is banned in the United Kingdom.

The name Hizb ut-Tahrir is from the Arabic language, hizb al-tahrir (حزب التحرير), and literally means party of liberation or liberation party. Hizb means ‘party’, al means ‘the’ and in a possessive construction works like ‘of’. Tahrir means ‘liberation’. Think of liberation square or square of liberation (ميدان التحرير) in Cairo, Egypt, i.e. Tahrir Square. This is the place where most protestors gathered during December 2010 (after which president Mubarak lost power).

I have found that Hizb ut-Tahrir shares a lot in common with so-called Bolshevism (early 20th century Russian Communism). Both are/were political parties/movements looking to seize political power, with the belief of restoring justice to the world.

The Hizb ut-Tahrir splinter group Muhajirun (founded by Omar Bakri) differs from HT in that they believe in establishing an Islamic State anywhere in the world; whereas HT primarily focuses on the Middle East (while recruiting elsewhere). Similarly, after Lenin’s death, the Communist Party began to have internal disagreements, the major one being between the Trotskyists (international or permanent revolution) and Stalinists (communism in one country).

When discussing democracy, Hizb ut-Tahrir will use the worst examples. Likely, they will reference the origins of the word, i.e. Athens, Ancient Greece (and not so much current day democracy in the UK). Further, HT believe that voting should be done within the party alone and not by the masses.

J. H. Arnold writes: “Democracy was born in ancient Athens, or so we like to believe; but no historian of antiquity would equate the government of that city with twentieth-century representative politics. The founders of the American Constitution spoke of ‘rights’ in universal and ‘natural’ terms (‘We hold these truths to be self-evident…’), but they did not believe that women or the poоr should have the vote, and they owned slaves. They were not complete hypocrites, but partly products of their time, and of what they took for granted in their world.”

Bolsheviks saw parliamentary democracy (around 19th/20th century) as a bourgeois democracy (representing those with wealth) and believed the later Soviet system (elected worker councils) to be the real democracy. However, in practice, real power lay with the Communist party (in front of which was a public façade of Soviet democracy) and over time the people became disillusioned with Soviet rule. Meanwhile, the petty democracies of Western Europe became more inclusive of the masses.

It is a part of the methodology of Hizb ut-Tahrir that in order to gain power in the Middle East, they would need to convince the military to carry out a coup d’état. This need not be bloody, but history shows that military coups are rarely bloodless (for instance in Syria or Iraq, etc). Likewise, the Bolsheviks also believed in taking power by force and did so in November 1917, resulting in over a dozen deaths. In addition, their lack of cooperation with others and disregard of the (elected) constituent assembly was followed by a bloody and painful civil war.

If/once the military coup is successful, HT’s plan is the setting up of a one-party state, i.e. Hizb ut-Tahrir, which would keep in check the (HT appointed) caliph/president. As explained already, alongside the Soviet democratic structure, the Bolsheviks also set-up a one-party state, which is really what governed the country.

Just as the Bolsheviks saw themselves as the vanguard of the working-class, Hizb ut-Tahrir also sees itself as the vanguard of the Muslims. There is no debate outside the party, only inside. After all, they are the true intelligentsia, or so they think.

Hizb ut-Tahrir operates in semi secrecy. They organise somewhat public lectures for their supporters and recruitment purposes, and private courses for those who aspire to become members. Before the 1917 revolution, the Bolsheviks similarly operated in a semi-underground fashion.

Hizb ut-Tahrir claims to follow classical texts from the Muslim tradition. For example, they will mention Imam Shafi’s Risala. However, they also contradict this book. For instance, they do not have faith in ahad hadith (prophetic narratives with fewer chains), yet Imam Shafi’s book includes a chapter on accepting habar al-wahid, (which includes a narrative referring to the story of Musa and Khidr). Similarly, Bolsheviks were criticised for not having the correct interpretation of Das Kapital (by Karl Marx). For example, the so-called Mensheviks believed that socialism could be achieved via a peaceful transfer of power, from the industrialists to the proletariat. Indeed, during the civil war, they (with other socialists) managed to set-up a short-lived egalitarian society (before it was absorbed by the counter-revolutionists, etc).

Hizb ut-Tahrir sometimes claims that they have a purely political focus, but in order to become a member one actually must take on their creed (aqueeda), which is not exactly Muslim orthodoxy or the majority Muslim faith. For details, ask the Sufis and the Wahhabis. Initially, the Bolsheviks were also in contrast to perhaps the majority of the social democratic movement, but since they were able to take power (for almost a century) their version of socialism is the one that became prominent in the first half of the 20th century. For instance, the authorities in 1920s Germany associated socialism locally (perhaps wrongly) with what they heard about happening within Soviet Russia.

Hizb ut-Tahrir’s notion of an Islamic State was never realised in the 20th century; despite their founder saying it would take no more than 30 years. Meanwhile, the Bolsheviks were in power for over 70 years, but did not achieve socialism.

Sources:
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2024/jan/15/islamist-group-hizb-ut-tahrir-to-be-banned-organising-uk
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Bolshevik
Arnold, John H. History: A Very Short Introduction. 2000. Oxford University Press.

Great Arab Revolt Centennial

It was suppose to be my last day in Jordan.  However, due to the Great Arab Revolt centennial celebration, I almost ended up getting stuck again in Amman. 

Many people were celebrating and making their way to a party.  Consequently, the roads were choc-o-bloc with vehicles and my already booked taxi arrived late (to pick me up).  Fortunately, the driver said he knew a short-cut to the airport.

At the airport, (at least one minute before check-in officially closes), the Qatar airline counter staff member informed me that check-in was closed.  Internally, I had already resigned to the eventuality that I might remain in Jordan indefinitely.  However, I explained what had happened and, to my relief, she checked me in.

Had I missed my flight, what would I have done that day?  Celebrate with the locals?  Probably not.  I would have booked the next flight back to the UK or made my way to Cairo to complete my learning.

Some admirers of the Ottoman empire believe that it was primarily defeated by the Saudis (in collaboration by the Wahabis) in collusion with the British empire.  However, this is far from the truth.  Unfortunately, certain Middle Eastern political movements/parties further compound the myth through their publications.

For instance, as will be explained below, the book How the Khilafah was Destroyed, by Abdul Qadeem Zallum (endorsed by Hizb ut-Tahrir) contains a number of misunderstandings.  

Let us begin with ibn Abd al-Wahhab, his supporters would say that in the 18th century (backed by the Saudis) he established law and order in the Najd area (not part of the Ottoman state) and secured the pilgrim routes to Mecca and Medina, and in his letters made it clear that it is wrong to rebel against the rulers (unless they call to sin).

According to M. S. al-Munajjid, ibn Abd al-Wahhaab said to the people of al-Qaseem: “I believe that it is obligatory to hear and obey the leaders of the Muslims, whether they are righteous or immoral, so long as they do not enjoin disobedience towards Allaah. Whoever has become Caliph and the people have given him their support and accepted him, even if he has gained the position of caliph by force, is to be obeyed and it is haraam to rebel against him.” (Majmoo’at Mu’allafaat al-Shaykh, 5/11).

Actually, Kuwait was not under Ottoman rule in 1788.  In the 20th century, the Saudis (with their Bedouin army – Ikhwan) established their current kingdom, but they played a minor role in World War One (possibly a single skirmish with an Ottoman garrison, then war with Kuwait).

They were more concerned with local conflicts (e.g. Rashid dynasty). As far as I know, the Saudis never reached Amman, let alone Damascus. At the southern border of Jordan, they were bombed by the British Royal Air Force.

As for Abdul-Aziz ibn Muhammad, while it is clear that ibn Saud was not an ally of the Ottomans and might of had negotiations with the British, it has never been proven that he was an agent of the British empire.

The Sharifian Army of Mecca, who were the leaders of the Arab Revolt (1916), were bribed with gold and supplied with explosives (by the British empire). Their aim was a United Arab Kingdom, perhaps with Damascus as its capitol.  Faisal (or his army) made it to Damascus.

Later, Faisal was made king of Iraq (by the British).  His brother Abdullah was made king of Transjordan.  Apparently, their father, in the Hijaz, al-Sharif Hussein bin Ali proclaimed himself caliph in 1924.  Soon after, the Hejazi Army (after defeating the Ottomans in Mecca and Medina) lost the Hijaz to the Saudis.

Today, the remaining Sharifian royal family rule the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.   One need only visit the Martyrs museum in Amman or the World War One memorial in Salt, to understand that the Arab Revolt was led by Sharifian forces (initially near the Suez Canal, supported by British forces) and not by Saudi Bedouins in Najd.

Sources:
A History of the Modern Middle East, William L. Cleveland
Saudi Arabia: a case study in development, Fouad al-Fars
The Road to Mecca, Muhammad Asad
A History of Jordan, Philip Robins
A history of Iraq, Charles R. H. Tripp
https://islamqa.info/en/answers/9243/did-shaykh-muhammad-ibn-abd-al-wahhaab-rebel-against-the-ottoman-caliphate-and-what-was-the-reason-for-its-fall
https://www.britannica.com/place/Kuwait/History
https://cdn.britannica.com/89/4789-050-B6176F52/Expansion-Ottoman-Empire.jpg
https://cdn.britannica.com/40/131540-050-EFC5F6A7/Map-Arabia-insets-edition-Palestine-Jerusalem-Encyclopaedia-1902.jpg
http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/his_arabrevolt.html
https://cdn.britannica.com/49/183749-050-8A2CE93D/World-Data-Locator-Map-Saudi-Arabia.jpg
https://cdn.britannica.com/95/5795-050-F7E34466/Saudi-Arabia-map-features-locator.jpg

Mr Toxic

The conversation started with why, in the end, I had not studied for a masters in history.

Despite my passion for this subject, the answer for me was simple: the banking crisis of 2008 and the subsequent personal financial loss in the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Apparently, I had misunderstood the situation.  Qadir Ali argued that studying the Arabic language in Alexandria would lead to a job and a better career.  He also tried to convince me that I am not the engineering type and that my degree in computer science was a mistake.

The opposite is true.  By following his plan, I lost more than three years and was over 100,000 dollars (financially) worse off.

When looking back, it is very clear that one cannot trust most of what he says.  Was a liar, is a liar and probably always will be a liar.

The truth is that Qadir Ali only joined a FANG company (Facebook, Apple, Netflix, Google) after attaining a 1st class Arabic (and Islamic studies) degree from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) and not from Alexandria, but this was not before being unemployed for six months and then working as a sales-type for a hardware company, for a year, based in some village near High Wycombe.

While encouraging me to leave an IT career, I later learned, he was studying  the Japanese language and Machine Learning; perhaps eyeing a Google (Alphabet) career in Japan?

As late as 2013, I was having doubts about his plan for me, but he told me to man-up and compared me to a mutual friend (of an expat family from UAE) who had studied eastern history exclusively with English texts (hence, in his opinion, a loser).

He also tried to convince me that I need to do at least four years of Arabic in order to study history at SOAS.  Qadir Ali made this claim despite knowing that according to the professor (the convenor of the history module, which I was interested in) two years of Arabic would probably be fine (and all I would probably need is a few months revision).  He also kept it to himself that I could purchase the actual course Arabic texts from the SOAS bookshop, (which I could focus my attention on, but I guess that would lead to a more successful outcome and that is not really what he wanted – as became clear later).  In the end, he even recommended I do a degree (3-4 years) in Arabic at Leiden university.

Qadir Ali misled me about Alexandria.  For example, he promoted the library as open 24-7 when actually it’s open only until around 5pm.  He described the city as the most beautiful place in the Middle East, but failed to mention the mountains of rubbish (that you will come across every 1000 metres).

He claimed that the programme in Alexandria was superior to that in SOAS and that the SOAS graduates could not speak Arabic.  He should know (I thought), he studied in both places.

Before going out there, he insisted I study Egyptian Colloquial Arabic (ECA), but after I enrolled for both Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) and ECA, he explained that the colloquial course is rubbish and that I needed to sit in the smoke-filled coffee houses to learn the dialect (therefore, thanks to him, 850 US dollars immediately wasted in fees to a racist institute).  He also wanted to send me Egyptian dramas (perhaps illegally downloaded), suggesting this is the way to learn. 

Why then did he tell me to enrol at the TAFL center in Alexandria? 

What was his motivation for deceiving me?  Was he bored with his translation career.  Is Dublin, Ireland not as exciting as he imagined?  Did it anger him for not being able to find a job in London?  Or does he regret not following a different career path; one that would sooner lead to a job in his hometown of Newcastle?  Or was he fed-up of sharing apartments with strangers and not being able to afford a one-bed flat and save money at the same time.  Or was it for his retarded ego?

With hindsight, I should have left him from day one.  Back then (five years ago), Qadir was often abusing people, but perhaps we felt sorry for him because he started out his student life in London by sleeping on the buses.  I also thought he genuinely wanted to be my friend and (much) later (on) wanted to help me sort out my career.  I use to think that his rough side was due to his upbringing in Newcastle (never been there myself), but this was a misconception.  He was simply aspiring to be a fountain of lies.  I guess his definition of friendship was different from mine.

After Qadir returned from his year abroad in Alexandria, I was excited to meet up with him in Hampstead Heath (where is was staying), but he had an abusive attitude (that I had to correct before continuing) and I found him with a cigarette in his mouth, which I ignored (perhaps at my own peril), which I did not expect for a person who did not even want to go to the cinema with us.  Was it really because he could not afford such entertainment, (but then how could he afford cigarettes)?

Another omen was when Qadir seconded the opinions of the mixed-heritage guy from Jordan, but later criticised him in a phone-call to me (as a way back into my life – I now realise).  Much later, once he was confident again in his use of weasel words, he justified the Jordanian mixed-heritage guy’s retarded arguments or downright lies.

What did I do to deserve this?  Had I not been a friend?  He use to brag about being working-class and perhaps, for a while, I saw myself in him (not the bragging bit) – working my hardest to get out of poverty and then to culture myself and help others.

My father once said, that (as a child) he always preferred the poor over the rich.  Perhaps that only works in the countryside or perhaps times have changed.  Whatever the reason, now I know from experience, you cannot judge a person by their economic background.

At least a couple of times, I paid for his lunch/dinner and encouraged him to study hard and not concern himself with the lack of motivation of his rich-kid classmates, which he was becoming increasingly obsessed about (whose parents were always going to sort them out with money or a job).

I even invited Qadir to my parent’s home where he enjoyed my mother’s cooking, and my late father had sincerely welcomed him.  However, none of this appears to have made a difference.

Three years from now, he will honour me with impoverishment and a ruined academic (and working) career.  I suppose we should expect no less from somebody who aspires to be a munafiq.

The hypocrites will be in the lowest depths of Hell, and you will find no one to help them (4:145).

Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani

Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani was born before the Great War, in Ottoman Palestine. He lived through the British mandate years and beyond the proclamation of Israel in 1948.

He authored a number of books and his focus became the establishment of the khilafa. In the 1950s, he founded Hizb ut-Tahrir in Jerusalem. He spent his last years in Lebanon.

How much of Hizb al-Tahrir is a product of Nabhani’s thinking is uncertain, but the loss of his homeland, during the rule of the British Empire, might of contributed to the HT notion of a British conspiracy against the Ottoman Empire.

Sources:
https://www.icct.nl/publication/problems-banning-hizb-ut-tahrir-britain
https://www.thenationalnews.com/lifestyle/travel/ticket-to-ride-how-projects-hope-to-restore-life-to-hejaz-railway-s-abandoned-tracks-1.962732

British and French mandatory policies in Iraq and Syria between the two World Wars

Here I compare and contrast Iraq with Syria (specifically what later became the country Syria as opposed to Greater Syria, which might include Lebanon), focusing on political and economic sovereignty. After the First World War, the League of Nations entrusted the Iraqi mandate to the British Empire and the Syrian mandate to the French Empire. Initially, both Iraq and Syria came under direct rule from Britain and France respectively, but later experienced limited self-rule and eventually gained independence. However, as will be shown, the timetable and method used by these ‘former’ colonial Powers differed greatly.

Iraq was constructed from the three Ottoman provinces: Basra, Baghdad and Mosul. By the end of the First World War, Britain more or less occupied all three territories and for economic and security reasons decided to consolidate them. From ‘1921 Britain adopted a policy of devolving responsibilities to an ‘Iraqi’ government.’ This government was headed by a monarch and for that the British chose Faisal Husain (of the Hashemite dynasty, which had led the Arab revolt in Arabia during the First World War), who was forced to leave Syria (see below). Consequently, the new political and military elite of Iraq were made up of Amir Faisal and his Sharifian entourage – most of whom were Sunni Arabs. However, over half the Arab population were Shi’a, who did not trust British ambitions and were not keen with the idea of the new state if it did not fairly represent the Shi’a majority. In other words, a Shi’a nation ruled by a Sunni ex-Ottoman elite. This was complicated further by the Mosul province that included part of the ‘homeland’ of the Kurdish people (most of whom were Sunni). Including all three provinces in the new Iraq made the Shi’a the minority. However, Kurdish tribal leaders sought more autonomy and had significant support amongst their people. In addition to force and limited Iraqi self-rule, Britain used patronage to pacify the Iraqi leaders. Eventually, this worked with some of the Shi’a leaders in the South (especially after the main mujtahids had left for Iran).

Syria was also constructed from smaller Ottoman entities. The mandate (approved in 1922) ‘defined the objective of French rule as “to facilitate the progressive development of Syria and Lebanon as independent states”.’ However, France initially implemented policies similar to those used in its existing colonies elsewhere. Instead of using Amir Faisal to work towards an independent state, they ejected the ‘Arab nationalist Hashemite-led administration’ (that had arrived in Syria’s capitol of Damascus before the French) and replaced it and the previous Ottoman institutions. Syria’s Muslim population was eight-five percent, but unlike Iraq, the majority of Syria’s population was Sunni Muslim. They also made-up most of the traditional ex-Ottoman elite, but France had demoted their status by giving preference to minority groups (some of whom had been neglected by the Ottomans) . Many of the officials of the new administration were Frenchman and also lacked the necessary language skills (although this changed later). Most of the natives they employed were usually Christian and rarely Sunni Muslim. The ‘French staff officers generally held a low opinion of Arab Muslims, Kurds, and Druzes’ and even had a low opinion of the Syrian Officials they did employ. Even though in the long term, a large number of Frenchman were stationed in Syria there was little attempt to assimilate with the native people.

British policy towards Iraqi rule had initially been represented ‘by those who came to be known as the ‘imperial school’.’ For this reason direct rule had been attempted initially, but due to widespread dissatisfaction and unrest (which was seen as a result of direct rule and was very costly to suppress), it was decided that a more indirect form of rule should be pursued. This long term policy of indirect rule was illustrated in November 1920 when an ‘Iraqi’ government was formed, headed by the naqib al-ashraf of Bagdad, Sayyid ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Kailani, and with twenty-one Iraqi ministers. It was Sunni dominated but the ministers were from all three provinces and included a few Shi’a and Christians and one Jew. Here at least the British were taking note of Iraq’s demographics. The former Ottoman administrative units and municipal councils were also restored, ‘and Iraqi officials began to replace British political officers in the provinces (except in the Kurdish district of Sulaimaniyyah).’ However, British advisors assisted the Iraqi officials in the provinces and were attached to the new ministries. In June 1921 a ‘bogus referendum was held in which it was claimed that 96 per cent of the population of Iraq accepted the new king’ Faisal Husain ‘and on 23 August 1921 Faisal was ceremoniously enthroned.’ Britain control of Iraq was via treaties and in 1922 an Anglo-Iraqi treaty recognised the devolving of power to the Iraqi government. However, control was retained by Britain of financial, international, security and certain judicial affairs . This treaty was opposed by a great number of the masses as well as the elites. It is argued that Iraq had no choice but to accept the 1922 treaty, and that Britain gave the Constituent Assembly an ultimatum to ratify it. The meaning of this is that Iraq had not achieved full political sovereignty, nor did it have zero control over its affairs, but that Britain indirectly controlled Iraq. This in essence was the mandatory policy of Britain between the wars.

While Britain tried to unite the three provinces of Iraq, the French decided to divide Syria into three autonomous regions ‘with separate areas for the Alawis on the coast and the Druze in the south.’ Also, politically the French did not give any representation to the majority Sunni population whereas in Iraq representation was given to the Shi’a – albeit not accurately reflecting their percentage of the population. The ‘French administration was an oversized and expensive bureaucratic ship’ and eventually much of the financial burden of defence and public security was shifted onto the Syrian people. In Iraq the British were somewhat concerned with cost-effectiveness and therefore decided on indirect control. In other words, the British were prepared to use any means to gain from the Iraqi mandate (even as late as 1930 a treaty was signed – see below). Whereas the French were determined to keep direct control over the population, which in practice meant denying opportunities to the majority. In Iraq, an Arab nationalist (Amir Faisal) had become king, but in Syria the nationalists were denied the top jobs. Both Britain and France used and would continue to use force in their mandates. However, France’s method of relying on minorities and a large foreign administration (and army) was both costly and unstable. This also denied political experience to the Syrians when the state finally became independent.

Economic policy in Iraq could be dictated by patronage, which might include tax exemptions. Land-reform was sometimes used in order to maintain the power of the pro-Hashemite ruling elite or pacify potential enemies of the state. Several development projects had been planned and even implemented during the 1920s, however, most of the King’s energies and resources were devoted to ensuring his political survival. In the 1930s, the King had encouraged agricultural development, but lack of interest from affluent Iraqis and the British to invest meant that production from this sector was not increased. Britain’s significant economic policy towards Iraq concerned oil and via the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC) Britain acquired favourable concessions. Therefore, apart from oil, Britain did not really develop Iraq’s economy and in the 1930s Iraq faced economic difficulties. However, this is in part due to the world-wide economic recession – starting in 1929. Moreover, Britain’s economic policies were not directly harmful to the local economy.

On the other hand, French economic policy included controlling Syria’s monetary system. This fixed a new Syrian currency to the Franc, which later caused problems when the French currency lost it value to the US dollar. France also sold public utilities to French businesses and the transfer of the Muslim-owned Hejaz Railway to a French railroad company in 1924 caused a big outcry and protest in Syria. According to P. S. Khoury, the French violated the Mandate charter by favouring French business to the extent that it did not allow equality of opportunity to all members of the League of Nations. Also, the French High Commission unfairly served the interest of French businesses by manipulating markets, which caused harm to Syrian businesses. For example, false rumours of a bad harvest were spread and then grain exports were banned. French agents were then able to buy grain cheaply and sell at a higher prices when the borders were re-opened for export. There was generally a lack of encouragement or will (on the part of the French) to develop the Syrian economy, but only to further French commercial interests.

Britain’s significant policy in Iraq was intended to safeguard her trading interests in the Basra province and elsewhere and to guarantee access to oil in the region. This meant pursuing a very difficult policy of nation-building a state made up of the three most ethnically and religiously diverse Arab-majority regions of the former Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire had hitherto administrated these lands as separate decentralised provinces. But Britain wanted a buffer (Baghdad) for the southern Basra province and a buffer (Mosul) for Baghdad and its policies were indifferent to the local situation. Oil made a unified Iraq even more important and it was vital to maintain the power of the Hashemite King (who was Arab, had religious significance and a British ally). As long as Britain’s commercial and security objectives were met her policy was quite relaxed in other areas. Existing elites were encouraged to work with the largely new Sharifian elites. Also, there was not much intrusion in religion, for example, the Organic law of 1925 made Islam the state religion. The main issue of the Shi’a was political power – they were under-represented. In Syria, however, the French decided and maintained a large presence and left the country only as late as 1946. Their policy was direct rule and economic control. Britain’s and France’s policies were similar in that neither country wanted true sovereignty for their mandates. The British would only support it as long as their interests were satisfied so their intentions were similar to the French. The difference is whereas Britain’s policies can clearly be seen as paving the way for Iraqi native rule, France’s policy is seen by P. S. Khoury and W. L. Cleveland as though Syria was a mandate only by name, and in practice a newly acquired colony to exploit and deny sovereignty to.

Bibliography

Cleveland, W. L, A History of the Modern Middle East, 1994, Boulder.

Eppel M, Iraq from Monarchy to Tyranny: From the Hashemites to the Rise of Saddam, Florida: 2004, University of Florida.

Khoury, P. S, Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism 1920-1945, London: 1987, I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd.

Tripp, C, A History of Iraq, Cambridge: 2000, CUP.

Yapp, M.E. The Making of the Modern Near East 1792-1923, London: 1987, Pearson Education.